Thoughts on the National Commission on Forensic Science

The federal government has established a National Commission on Forensic Science (NCFS) to "improve the practice of forensic science by developing guidance concerning the intersections between forensic science and the criminal justice system." (DOJ press release) The Commission follows a highly critical National Academy of Sciences report that asserted major problems within the forensic sciences, especially with respect to the subjective disciplines, such as fingerprint examination. NCFS has now met twice, and I was privileged to be able to attend one day of the second meeting while I was in Washington on a recent trip.

The Commission seeks a laudable goal: the improvement of the administration of justice through higher standards in the crime laboratory. The commission room was full of well-meaning, obviously intelligent leaders of the same type that one sees at all such DC-based committee meetings. The room was also filled to the brim with the type of naivete that too often inflicts such affairs. I fear that high-mindedness is not a substitute for a practical sense of how law enforcement, the crime laboratory and science interact to produce forensic results in the criminal justice system. They may end up doing more harm than good.

To start, let's take an honest look at the actual problem. NCFS members and advocates for forensic science reform often refer to the post-conviction exonerations that have been aided by the advent of DNA over the last twenty year. Over 300 such cases have resulted in exonerations (http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/DNA_Exonerations_Nationwide.php). We can surmise that there are many more innocent individuals in prison today, because the exonerations are usually limited to cases in which DNA is available to clear someone and advocates available to champion the innocent person's cause. About half of the DNA exonerations involved the use of faulty forensic science ( http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/FSBreakdownDiscipline.pdf). That said, the vast majority of these cases would not recur in current practice. The top two sources of error have been serology and hair evidence. Serology is the examination of blood type, which can be confounded by mixtures or misinterpretation. There is little danger of improper serology these days. In such cases, DNA analysis is always possible, so serology is merely a preliminary step to more detailed and specific analysis. Hair analysis matches the morphology of hair from a crime scene to hair from a suspect. Although morphological hair examination continues, there is no reason it should result in a wrongful conviction because it can now be checked using mitochondrial DNA analysis (or even nuclear DNA analysis on occasion). Given the legitimate concerns about hair analysis, no well-run crime laboratory in 2014 should be reporting morphological hair matches by themselves; such matches should be used as screening tools only and always lead to DNA analysis to confirm or exclude an individual. 

The next two categories of forensic errors are instructive: DNA and bitemark. Bitemark evidence is in the same category as hair evidence. Except in isolated cases involving unusual impressions, bitemark evidence is so unreliable that it should not be relied upon in criminal cases. The DNA cases all involved improper testimony or analysis, i.e., analysts who performed poor analysis, reported it incorrectly or were just plain fraudulent. In other words, the top four sources of forensic errors--covering 93% of the postconviction cases involving bad forensic science--can be avoided by good laboratory management. A competent crime laboratory director knows to restrict hair analysis, serology, and bitemark evidence to very limited circumstances. And a good director is also more than capable of making sure that other analyses are performed with high standards of scientific practice and ethics. 

Thus far, the NCFS has focused almost exclusively on the scientific basis of the forensic sciences, particularly with respect to fingerprint evidence and cognitive bias. Also, only a small minority of the NCFS members have ever performed a forensic analysis, so their deliberations have tended to be so high-level as to prevent them from engaging in practical analysis and leadership.

However, given the actual lessons from exonerations, they would do much more good examining other issues. They should advocate for professional standards in crime laboratories, especially among crime laboratory directors. I have known crime lab directors from across the country. I have never witnessed sustained problems in a lab run by an experienced and well-educated crime laboratory director who had solid leadership skills.

Of course, there are problems in certain practice areas. The NCFS should immediately stake a claim on the limitations of hair and bitemark evidence. That said, they should avoid poorly-based criticisms of fingerprint evidence and other disciplines. There is a clear, well-established, and scientific basis for the individuality and persistence of fingerprint patterns. In addition, research has shown that practitioners have a bias to exclusion of suspects when latent prints are ambiguous, especially in light of high-profile errors such as during the Madrid bombing investigation. Forensic scientists represent the most objective corner of the criminal justice system. Police investigators, lawyers, and judges engage in wholly unscientific and wildly biased judgments all the time. That's why false confessions, poor detective work, and prosecutor and defense misconduct are very often the heart of false convictions, including in most cases in which forensic science may have been improperly applied. To be sure, that makes it all the more important for us to ensure the reliability of forensic results. Nonetheless, I argue that critics may contribute to future false convictions by undermining the confidence of the criminal justice community in forensic results. Further, I maintain that trial judges are often loath to exclude what may be questionable forensic results because they are faced with much shakier eyewitness or other evidence every day. In comparison to that reality, fingerprints are indeed the Holy Grail of reliability.

The NCFS should engage with police leaders and state and local governments to address these broader issues. In Houston, Detroit and elsewhere, police departmetns and local governments failed to prioritize the funding of crime laboratories. In many jurisdictions to this day, crime laboratories lack training and infrastructure. Pay is also an issue. Personally, I have known many, idealistic young people who chose to study forensic science in college only to find that their income in the crime laboratory did not match their CSI dreams and was a small fraction of what they could make in private-sector chemical or biomedical laboratories. 

In the real world thus far, concerns about reliability have led to much more documentation and paperwork. The NCFS appears headed in the direction of mandating even more elaborate protocols and paperwork, though there is scant evidence that the "solutions" being discussed will actually result in improved reliability of results. Lab practitioners know this and live it every day, and they are increasingly cynical about federal mandates in which they have little voice and for which there is no funding. The NCFS could advocate for additional federal funding to back up their mandates. Forgive me my own cynicism in this regard. The likely result is a few more Coverdell dollars (or none) and state and local labs having to implement difficult mandates within their already constrained resources. Again, we may be faced with the unintended consequences that follow: crime labs that are stressed to deal with higher backlogs and greater delays that inevitably lead to sloppier work and reliability problems. 

Of course, there have been some excellent studies in recent years on cognitive bias in forensic practice. I am a particular fan of Itiel Dror's work and recommendations. (See, e.g., The forensic confirmation bias: Problems, perspectives, and proposed solutions.) The NIST scientific advisory committees would be well-served by a close examination of that work, followed by practical recommendations that implement the most workable ideas without adding to the time and expense of forensic identification. On such matters, it is sufficient for the NCFS to urge on the work, not substitute its own biases. 

In fact, that is exactly my point. If forensic scientists are susceptible to bias, then so too are the members of the NCFS. They come with points of view that are not necessarily aligned with absolute truth and justice. In this, we may hope that they are more self-aware than other federal advisory committees, because they know that bias is part of any human-centered business. With such humility, they may yet end up doing some good.

For more information about John Morgan and his consulting business, see www.coptechllc.org.

Continued from this post.

The conventional military should not be expected to do counter-insurgency and nation-building anyway. They aren’t trained to do it. We need professional soldiers and civilians who have the education, training, and inclination for that very specialized work. Fortunately, we have a foundation in special operations. Back in the 1960’s, President John F. Kennedy was a great proponent of special warfare. The iconic special warfare school at Fort Bragg is even named after him. It’s not a coincidence that he also started the Peace Corps, which is the closest civilian counterpart to the Green Berets. By this, I mean the real Green Berets, the ones who know the local language, live in villages, and work side-by-side with their indigenous friends. If we are going to win the War on Terror, we’ll need a bigger Special Operations Command and a bigger Peace Corps.
The bin Laden raid may have created a misleading impression of special forces. The average American believes that special operations are about nighttime raids and elite strike forces. Such surgical strike capabilities are, no doubt, an important part of special operations. For many years now, elite units like the 75th Ranger Regiment have conducted thousands of such strike operations. With drone strikes, they have become the primary way that the United States engages in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. And they’re really good at it. The vast majority of the time, these units capture their target. What is less known is that nobody gets hurt most of the time—not the American soldiers, not the target, not any bystanders. These soldiers are well-trained and well-equipped and exhibit the highest professional standards. But they represent only one element of special operations.
Most of the military is about the domination of physical space. The Army dominates the land, the Navy the sea, and so on. And they are about minimizing risk. They put as much force as possible at the point of attack to maximize effects and minimize casualties (well, their own casualties). Special operations is about maximizing opportunity and human engagement. In the Phillippines during World War II, some Americans escaped Japanese internment and the Bataan death march. Under Major Russell Volckmann, they formed a Filipino guerilla army in Luzon that fought the Japanese occupation throughout the war. Volckmann later became influential in the development of unconventional warfare doctrine with special operations. The original Afghan invasion was—in my view—the ultimate expression of the power of special operations. With apologies to Vice President Biden, it was the most audacious military undertaking since Cortez. A very short time after the 9/11 attacks, 350 soldiers under then-Colonel John Mulholland joined with the Northern Alliance and other Afghans as part of Task Force Dagger. The local tribes gave them horses, even the Air Force combat controllers who were there to call in air strikes from half a world away. Their first battle was October 21 against a dusty town called Bishqab. By December, the Taliban had collapsed and Hamid Karzai was ruling a provisional government in Kabul. There were only a handful of American casualties during this time. A statue of a Special Forces soldier on horseback, called the America’s Response Monument, sits in front of One World Trade Center in New York to commemorate the daring feats. Oddly, these amazing events have never received the accolades they are due. But they represent how American power can be truly effective in this new era. America’s technology and know-how certainly turned the tide in the conflict, but in the end it was the Afghans themselves who overthrew the Taliban. In the best tradition of special operations, Mulholland’s forces acted by, with and through their Afghan allies. They built a relationship of mutual trust and respect, a foundation that has slowly deteriorated since that time. Done with patience, such techniques can change the world. Sadly, the public sees special operations in a very different light and don’t understand the value they truly provide.
The original Task Force Dagger—small, nimble, opportunistic, and backed by overwhelming air support—is a model for military intervention and strategic engagement, but it flies in the face of conventional military and political thinking. The vast majority of military leaders are from the conventional forces, and they want to plan for “Air Sea Battle” against China, not messy asymmetric wars. Politicians want instant, push-button wars that are over in months, so they can take credit before the next election. Americans are tired of costly, protracted conflicts with poorly conceived objectives. Many fear globalization, which they associate with unemployment and terrorism. Young people are wondering what their lives will be like in this new era, when their counterparts in India and Brazil are just as educated but willing to work for next to nothing by American standards. To me, the answer is simple. Embrace the change. Be a part of it. Create the future you want. We don’t need to fear Mali. We need to be there. The young people who matter will be the ones who join Special Forces or the Peace Corps or become missionaries or go into international business. It is engagement on a human level that will make a difference. Our military and our government need to rebuild institutions that will be relevant in 2050. Those institutions should be designed to conduct the next great American enterprise—that of bringing the human family into the modern age by helping those around the world who are fighting terror and extremism and building businesses and civil institutions in their communities. Our technology provides the opportunity to make this happen. Social media, advanced analytics, and consumer-driven personal technology can all work in our favor to break down barriers and empower a rising tide of freedom and prosperity that benefits America because it benefits everyone. In terms of the War on Terror, we need to abandon many of the structures we built for the Cold War so we can breathe life into new institutions built for the Long War. Only then can we succeed in places like Afghanistan and Iraq and truly honor those who put their lives on the line in Abbottabad and countless other, less-well-known battlefields since September 11, 2001.

For more information on Coptech LLC training and consulting services, see www.coptechllc.com.

Motorcycles

The history of police technology is filled with examples in which police had to catch up with society or even with criminals. For example, police cars weren't common until after World War II. Even the federal government lacked armored cars for dignitaries, so Franklin Delano Roosevelt had to ride in Al Capone's seized 1928 Cadillac V-8 Town Sedan to the joint session of Congress on December 8, 1941. The car was fitted with inch-thick glass and lined with nearly 1,360kgs of armor plating, made of asbestos-wrapped steel plate embedded with pieces of lead. Reportedly, FDR rode it to the joint session of Congress on December 8, 1941. See http://www.topgear.com/uk/photos/Al-Capones-bulletproof-car-for-sale and
http://voices.yahoo.com/al-capones-armored-1928-cadillac-was-used-president-365026.html?cat=27.

Motorcycles were a very different story. In 1908, the first police Harley Davidson hit the streets. That was before civilians could buy one. By 1930, more than 3,000 agencies had Harley Davidson motorcycles, and 3,400 still do today. The company was saved by the police market, and it is still proud of the history to this day.

Motorcycles were in some sense the perfect mobility technology of the early 20th century. They were highly mobile, fast, and inexpensive relative to cars. You couldn't bring a bad guy back to the station, hence the paddy wagon, but it was a perfect complement to patrol in a rapidly suburbanizing country.

Police motorcades--replete with the requisite following motorcycles--became universally associated with dignitaries and momentous events. In the film of John F. Kennedy's assassination, the motorcycle cops are seen all about the motorcade and the president's car. It's one of the few details of the scene that isn't commonly remarked upon, let alone debated ad nauseum. That's because the police motorcycle had become so expected and universal by that time.

There is an interesting analogy to the modern Segway. Segway was introduced as a personal transportation vehicle for the mass market. But their most important market has been in public safety. During my time at NIJ, we did a lot to introduce law enforcement to the Segway (through the work of Mike O'Shea and the tech centers). At first, many of us were skeptical about the application, but the technology took on a life of its own very quickly. Heck, it even was featured in Mall Cop. The Segway has been adopted by a broad range of the public safety community, including bomb squads.

Like the motorcycle, Segways are highly mobile, relatively inexpensive compared to alternatives, and appropriate for the times. In airports, growing downtowns, and other pedestrian-friendly locales, the Segways are a perfect complement to patrol. Segways will never be as important as motorcycles, but they do play a useful role in many applications.

So, when the technology fits, police can take risks and be first adopters. All that is necessary is a company willing to make a long-term commitment to the public safety market and police leaders willing to take a chance to meet a real need. 

For more information on law enforcement technology training and consulting, see my company web site at www.coptechllc.com. 

Failures of counter-insurgency - part 2

Continued from this post.

Why has American military power--so overwhelmingly superior by almost any metric--been so unsuccessful in achieving basic war aims in the last generation?

It is an important question, maybe the most important of our time. The world is changing rapidly. The developing world has accelerating growth, and the gap between rich and poor nations is closing. Today, Iran or Egypt or Nigeria may be regional problems that require containment. In twenty or thirty years, they may have advanced nuclear capabilities or other weapons that are much more dangerous. The era of terrorism is the era of asymmetric warfare, when cyber weapons or IED’s can change battlefields or strike at a great power’s homeland. Hitler thought he could break Great Britain through a bombing campaign and, later, with rockets. Today, Hezbollah has rockets, the Taliban has IED’s, and North Korea has the atom bomb. In each case, for the time being, their capabilities are insufficient to overcome the technological advantage of the United States and its allies. The Iron Dome missile defense system has cut the heart out of the Hamas and Hezbollah strategy to use rockets, for example. But IED’s remained an essentially unsolved problem for the coalition in Afghanistan, despite huge resources expended on various solutions. In the future, directed energy weapons or biological terrorism or cyber threats may upend American military hegemony in an instant. I, for one, don’t welcome such a dangerous world. In any case, it is not in America’s interest to roll the dice on that future, especially when the problems with its military strategies are so clear.
Americans are prone to whining about their fate and their nation’s capabilities. We have heard a great deal about “imperial overstretch” and the threat of China in recent years. But these fears are falsehoods. America is the predominant political and military power of the current age by an immense margin. First and foremost, America possesses a military which is exquisitely well-designed to project power and suppress its enemies. The bin Laden raid is a wonderful example of that. The two wars against Iraq are great examples, too. And these wars did not stress the country in the least, taking a tiny percentage of GNP to prosecute.  If the United States wished, its military could vie with that of the entire rest of the world, including its allies in Europe and Asia, and prevail in a conventional conflict very quickly. Stealth bombers, Predator drones, and Aegis cruisers are excellent tools of war. The electronic and sensor systems behind those tools are even more impressive. But the military is awful at prolonged counter-insurgency conflicts or nation-building. And the United States is terrible at staying the course on that kind of project. As Patton said—in the movie at least—Americans love a winner and won’t tolerate a loser. They also won’t tolerate having to wait for victory. If it takes longer than a few months, then they don’t want any part of it.
I was against the Iraq war when it started, not because I questioned the possibility that Saddam Hussein may have had weapons of mass destruction. In fact, as a scientist in chemical-biological warfare defense, I was very familiar with his history. Today’s pundits conveniently forget that he used nerve agents against the Iranians and Kurds throughout the 1980’s and had been developing anthrax and other biological weapons right up to the time of the first Gulf War. His military had even experimented with novel ideas, such as the use of aflatoxin.  As it turns out, in 2003, he probably did not have weapons of mass destruction. I am sure he would have had such weapons if he could have obtained them. Those considerations aside, I opposed the war because I just didn’t believe Americans would tolerate a long, drawn-out conflict in Iraq, where three distinct groups—Shia, Sunni, and Kurd—have been fighting for centuries. (For those with an academic interest, I recommend Anabasis, which was written in the generation before Alexander the Great and which detailed the adventure of some Greek mercenaries coming home from war in Persia through current Kurdistan. It should be required reading for anyone in the military or foreign policy professions.) It was inevitable that Iraq would be a difficult quagmire barely amenable to external control or influence. Given the constraints, it is a small miracle that the military was able to achieve what it did, i.e., to create a peace that was sufficient to get out of the country with American dignity intact and leave the Iraqis to quarrel among themselves. And, in the north, the Kurds have established something akin to a modern state. Interestingly, it may be the no-fly zone of the 1990’s which played the major role: it protected the Kurds from Baathist domination but forced them to abandon internecine animosities and develop self-government. I did not believe that Iraq would be a quagmire because of anything I knew about American military capabilities, but because of the lessons of history. Even Julius Caesar spent ten years suppressing rebellions in ancient Gaul—modern-day France.  Eventually, those provinces “civilized” and wound up protecting the heritage of learning of the Roman Empire, but it took generations to establish that foundation. Julius Caesar was hailed as a hero by his people at the time; maybe the Romans had a more realistic view of what’s possible than modern-day Americans who are convinced that push-button wars can be won like a video game on their Xbox.
The American military produced a result better than anyone had a right to expect, all the more so because it is so hobbled by bureaucracy and Cold War thinking. The Army is America’s oldest bureaucracy, 237 years old, even predating the formation of the country itself. It shows. The Army is divided among its various specialties—intelligence, operations, communications, and so on—and personnel decisions are often ridiculously unrelated to operational needs or a soldier’s expertise. Procurement is run by the Program Executive Offices, PEO’s, who spend by the billions on well-defined programs within their bureaucratic empires. They are the Cardinals of the Pentagon. If something falls between PEO responsibilities, two things can happen, either a fight between PEO’s for the right to do the work or a “not my problem” mentality. Either way, the soldier doesn’t get what he needs. A good example of this is force protection equipment, things like camera systems or radars or barriers to protect remote bases from attack. After more than a decade of counterinsurgency warfare, the Pentagon still hadn’t figured out who was responsible for giving small units force protection equipment.

Still, the military is more flexible and dynamic than any other part of the federal government. That’s why they are more effective at hurricane relief than FEMA and better at foreign aid than the State Department. That’s important, because today’s conflicts require the engagement of people outside the military to manage. Military leaders talk about a “whole of government” approach, but for the most part civilian leaders are AWOL on the front lines, as you might expect. As often as not, when the military is talking about The Interagency, they mean working with the CIA, not the Peace Corps. In Afghanistan, aid focused on big projects like the Kabul “ring road” and other things the central government could control. In other places, like Africa or the Philippines, aid has caused as many security problems as it has solved, because money corrupts those who get it and makes everyone else jealous. The military does what it can, mostly by working with their indigenous military counterparts. So, the Afghan Army is the most advanced and professional organization in the country. But, then, so was the military in Egypt, while the police and courts and services were corrupt and untrusted by the people. So, when the crap hit the fan, the government didn’t have any civil institutions to rely on, even after 30 years of American aid.

Next: what's missing from conventional military doctrine and forces...

For more information about John Morgan and Cotpech LLC's consulting and training services, see www.coptechllc.com. 

Drug legalization in Portugal

A thought-provoking item in the media recently:

Portugal decriminalized marijuana and most other drugs over a decade ago, with good results:
http://www.businessinsider.com.au/portugal-drug-policy-decriminalization-works-2012-7

Interestingly, the American drug courts model is not far off from the Portuguese experience. Many jurisdictions have moved to de facto decriminalize drug use without regard to whether the state is a medical marijuana state or has legalized or formally decriminalized pot. Drug courts have proven to be extremely effective ways to "enforce" treatment mechanisms with difficult populations. Those who wind up in prison are often repeat offenders who have "flunked" diversion programs or are guilty of dealing. To be fair, of course, there are still many prisoners who are simply drug addicts who should be dealt with by other means that would be more effective. Prison is a blunt instrument for a difficult problem. Other community and residential settings would get better results, protect public safety more effectively, and cost a whole lot less.

That said, I oppose legalization of marijuana or other drugs. Most importantly, we don't have an effective means to do road-side or workplace drug tests in real-time. (Some work has been done.) Those tests that do exist are qualitative yes-no tests and do not yield quantitative results of impairment. That is in contrast to the breathalyzer, which performs this service quite well every day. We have no idea of the number of drug-impaired drivers out on our roads or in workplaces. Although MADD and other citizen efforts have made a big impact on drunken driving over the last 30 years, I think their efforts would have been in vain if it weren't for the breathalyzer. When pot legalization advocates are on the front line demanding the development of better drug detection technology, I will take them more seriously. Instead, you have many idiots saying that pot makes them better drivers because they are "more mellow." Good research--and common sense--suggest the contrary. Without good detection technology, drug use cannot be labelled a personal choice. The rest of us will always be at risk from the idiots out there who could endanger us while they are drug-impaired. In most cities, more than half of arrestees are drunk or drug-intoxicated, so we know the problem is widespread.

I have another issue with current marijuana policy. It puts police in untenable situations. Federal and state laws now directly contradict one another in specific locations. Although the federal government under Obama appears to be backing off from enforcement in those locations, this raises serious questions about the uniformity of law and punishment. We can't condone pot use in some places and even encourage finance of marijuana sellers, then lock people up for the same activity in a neighboring state. There are differences in other areas in law and enforcement across the country, but I know of no other case in which you can serve 20 years in one state for doing something that would be legal in another. Police are the ones who must deal with this every day. They are expected to enforce the local law and deal with the contradictions, which breed cynicism in law enforcement and among criminals alike. The medical marijuana states are the worst offenders in this regard. I remember a visit to a fusion center in California that invested heavily to identify raid sites for marijuana enforcement in the same city where medical marijuana dealers could be seen out the window. These contradictions have become institutionalized in many "progressive" places in Europe, such as in Holland. I hope we do better by the police and our society going forward.

Practice and pitfalls of science advising

I wrote an article recently on science advising for the Forum on Physics and Society of the American Physical Society. Having been a senior executive and advisor in the criminal justice and the military, they asked for some perspective about how scientists can impact public policy. The opening paragraph is below, followed by a link to the APS web site for the rest of the article. For those of you who are non-scientists, it might give you some insight into how scientists view the world.

Government leaders require high-quality, objective scientific advice on a daily basis. Science advisors have played critical roles in the development of almost every major policy initiative in the last generation. In many cases, scientists have led agencies in the federal government and executed technically-complex programs. Nonetheless, scientists are often underrepresented or ineffective in policy discussions. Scientific principles or ideas are often misrepresented or oversimplified to meet political objectives. Science professionals should understand the importance of their input into the policy and practice of government at all levels. Further, we must understand that successful engagement requires an understanding of politics and communication skills. Finally, the science advisor must combine a healthy skepticism of the limits of science with a passionate advocacy for the advancement of science across all disciplines.

See here for the rest...

For more information on my current work helping police, military and security professionals with science and technology, see www.coptechllc.com.

Failures of counter-insurgency

On the night of May 2, 2011, six helicopters carrying 79 commandos raided a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan and killed Osama bin Laden, mastermind of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that killed nearly 3,000 people. It was the culmination of a ten-year manhunt that used the full resources of the United States of America. Never in history has the world been witness to any power even remotely comparable to the American military and intelligence machine, and never before had that apparatus been turned against one individual with such focus and ferocity. The stated objective of the raid—to kill or capture bin Laden—does not capture the full reality. In truth, the raid was about justice or revenge, take your pick, and the commandos were there as judge, jury, and executioner. In this, they were wildly successful. The target was killed at the expense of one crashed helicopter and no American casualties.
The mission was hailed in the United States and around much of the world as an exemplar of military daring, technology, and sheer will. Vice President Joe Biden—never one for understatement—called it the most audacious military plan in 500 years, though he advised President Obama against the raid. (By the way, he was wrong. The most audacious military plan in 500 years was the original incursion into Afghanistan after 9/11, in which a handful of special operations forces helped a ragtag army of insurgents to overthrow the Taliban government in a couple of months with almost no loss of life among the Americans.) Even many Muslims welcomed bin Laden’s demise, because his violent jihad had become a distraction from democratic progress in the Muslim world. Only in Pakistan was the reaction entirely negative, and that was due to the humiliation dealt to the country’s military because of the unilateral American action. The United States did not notify or coordinate the raid with Pakistan in any way—or at least any way that’s been public to date. And the Pakistanis appear to have been completely unable to react to the raid while it progressed at all. They seemed as completely oblivious as the Pakistani IT nerd, Sohaib Athar, who live-tweeted the raid that night.  In my view, though, his account was as accurate and insightful as any outside the Joint Special Operations Command headquarters, especially given his insights into his Pakistani countrymen. Osama bin Laden will not be mourned by many in the Islamic world, even those who resent or hate the United States for its actions in the War on Terror.
But, it is fair to ask, was the mission a success on a broader, strategic level? By this, I mean the real mission, that of fighting terror, ensuring stability and extending freedom in the world. Did America win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Has the War on Terror fundamentally changed the dynamic that led to the 9/11 attacks? In this sense, the blood and treasure expended has been a failure. Terror has been suppressed, to be sure, but Islamist extremism is alive and well. Iraq and Afghanistan are not shining beacons of democracy and individual freedom, though one may certainly argue they are better off than they were in 2001. North Africa has become a seething cauldron from Sudan and Libya to Nigeria and Mali. Iran, the Philippines, Syria, Yemen and North Korea all represent serious strategic challenges with no end in sight. One would hope that unbridled American power could produce more salutary results.
The next question is obvious: why not? Some would argue that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq—particularly the latter—were ill-conceived and doomed to failure. Pacifists and isolationists oppose the overuse of the American war machine. My question, though, is different. I am not asking about the wisdom of the wars, which is an interesting question but not my point. Instead, I am asking why American power did not succeed regardless of the wisdom of the adventure. After all, Genghis Khan had the closest thing to the kind of dominant military machine of modern America and terrorized all of Europe and Asia. But what did the Mongols gain by sacking Kiev and Baghdad? Their thirteenth century wars did not make Mongolia rich or a great power for very long and I doubt if the Mongolians as a people were better off as a result of them, so it is fair to question the wisdom of their rampages. But they won the wars nonetheless, leaving those cities and dozens more in smoldering ruins. Wise or not, they won their wars without question. The United States is capable of winning wars. After World War II, military force gave way to nation-building and the Axis powers became allies of the United States. After the Cold War, Eastern Europe and the Baltic republics became free and the Soviet Union changed into Russia, an autocratic state but an essentially lesser rival. But it is unclear whether the war aims in Iraq and Afghanistan, whatever they actually were, have been achieved. Like Vietnam, messy conflicts have given way to ambiguous results.

More on this in later posts...

For more information on John Morgan's company, Coptech LLC, a provider of consulting and training services for police, military, and other security sectors, see www.coptechllc.com.