Failures of counter-insurgency - part 2

Continued from this post.

Why has American military power--so overwhelmingly superior by almost any metric--been so unsuccessful in achieving basic war aims in the last generation?

It is an important question, maybe the most important of our time. The world is changing rapidly. The developing world has accelerating growth, and the gap between rich and poor nations is closing. Today, Iran or Egypt or Nigeria may be regional problems that require containment. In twenty or thirty years, they may have advanced nuclear capabilities or other weapons that are much more dangerous. The era of terrorism is the era of asymmetric warfare, when cyber weapons or IED’s can change battlefields or strike at a great power’s homeland. Hitler thought he could break Great Britain through a bombing campaign and, later, with rockets. Today, Hezbollah has rockets, the Taliban has IED’s, and North Korea has the atom bomb. In each case, for the time being, their capabilities are insufficient to overcome the technological advantage of the United States and its allies. The Iron Dome missile defense system has cut the heart out of the Hamas and Hezbollah strategy to use rockets, for example. But IED’s remained an essentially unsolved problem for the coalition in Afghanistan, despite huge resources expended on various solutions. In the future, directed energy weapons or biological terrorism or cyber threats may upend American military hegemony in an instant. I, for one, don’t welcome such a dangerous world. In any case, it is not in America’s interest to roll the dice on that future, especially when the problems with its military strategies are so clear.
Americans are prone to whining about their fate and their nation’s capabilities. We have heard a great deal about “imperial overstretch” and the threat of China in recent years. But these fears are falsehoods. America is the predominant political and military power of the current age by an immense margin. First and foremost, America possesses a military which is exquisitely well-designed to project power and suppress its enemies. The bin Laden raid is a wonderful example of that. The two wars against Iraq are great examples, too. And these wars did not stress the country in the least, taking a tiny percentage of GNP to prosecute.  If the United States wished, its military could vie with that of the entire rest of the world, including its allies in Europe and Asia, and prevail in a conventional conflict very quickly. Stealth bombers, Predator drones, and Aegis cruisers are excellent tools of war. The electronic and sensor systems behind those tools are even more impressive. But the military is awful at prolonged counter-insurgency conflicts or nation-building. And the United States is terrible at staying the course on that kind of project. As Patton said—in the movie at least—Americans love a winner and won’t tolerate a loser. They also won’t tolerate having to wait for victory. If it takes longer than a few months, then they don’t want any part of it.
I was against the Iraq war when it started, not because I questioned the possibility that Saddam Hussein may have had weapons of mass destruction. In fact, as a scientist in chemical-biological warfare defense, I was very familiar with his history. Today’s pundits conveniently forget that he used nerve agents against the Iranians and Kurds throughout the 1980’s and had been developing anthrax and other biological weapons right up to the time of the first Gulf War. His military had even experimented with novel ideas, such as the use of aflatoxin.  As it turns out, in 2003, he probably did not have weapons of mass destruction. I am sure he would have had such weapons if he could have obtained them. Those considerations aside, I opposed the war because I just didn’t believe Americans would tolerate a long, drawn-out conflict in Iraq, where three distinct groups—Shia, Sunni, and Kurd—have been fighting for centuries. (For those with an academic interest, I recommend Anabasis, which was written in the generation before Alexander the Great and which detailed the adventure of some Greek mercenaries coming home from war in Persia through current Kurdistan. It should be required reading for anyone in the military or foreign policy professions.) It was inevitable that Iraq would be a difficult quagmire barely amenable to external control or influence. Given the constraints, it is a small miracle that the military was able to achieve what it did, i.e., to create a peace that was sufficient to get out of the country with American dignity intact and leave the Iraqis to quarrel among themselves. And, in the north, the Kurds have established something akin to a modern state. Interestingly, it may be the no-fly zone of the 1990’s which played the major role: it protected the Kurds from Baathist domination but forced them to abandon internecine animosities and develop self-government. I did not believe that Iraq would be a quagmire because of anything I knew about American military capabilities, but because of the lessons of history. Even Julius Caesar spent ten years suppressing rebellions in ancient Gaul—modern-day France.  Eventually, those provinces “civilized” and wound up protecting the heritage of learning of the Roman Empire, but it took generations to establish that foundation. Julius Caesar was hailed as a hero by his people at the time; maybe the Romans had a more realistic view of what’s possible than modern-day Americans who are convinced that push-button wars can be won like a video game on their Xbox.
The American military produced a result better than anyone had a right to expect, all the more so because it is so hobbled by bureaucracy and Cold War thinking. The Army is America’s oldest bureaucracy, 237 years old, even predating the formation of the country itself. It shows. The Army is divided among its various specialties—intelligence, operations, communications, and so on—and personnel decisions are often ridiculously unrelated to operational needs or a soldier’s expertise. Procurement is run by the Program Executive Offices, PEO’s, who spend by the billions on well-defined programs within their bureaucratic empires. They are the Cardinals of the Pentagon. If something falls between PEO responsibilities, two things can happen, either a fight between PEO’s for the right to do the work or a “not my problem” mentality. Either way, the soldier doesn’t get what he needs. A good example of this is force protection equipment, things like camera systems or radars or barriers to protect remote bases from attack. After more than a decade of counterinsurgency warfare, the Pentagon still hadn’t figured out who was responsible for giving small units force protection equipment.

Still, the military is more flexible and dynamic than any other part of the federal government. That’s why they are more effective at hurricane relief than FEMA and better at foreign aid than the State Department. That’s important, because today’s conflicts require the engagement of people outside the military to manage. Military leaders talk about a “whole of government” approach, but for the most part civilian leaders are AWOL on the front lines, as you might expect. As often as not, when the military is talking about The Interagency, they mean working with the CIA, not the Peace Corps. In Afghanistan, aid focused on big projects like the Kabul “ring road” and other things the central government could control. In other places, like Africa or the Philippines, aid has caused as many security problems as it has solved, because money corrupts those who get it and makes everyone else jealous. The military does what it can, mostly by working with their indigenous military counterparts. So, the Afghan Army is the most advanced and professional organization in the country. But, then, so was the military in Egypt, while the police and courts and services were corrupt and untrusted by the people. So, when the crap hit the fan, the government didn’t have any civil institutions to rely on, even after 30 years of American aid.

Next: what's missing from conventional military doctrine and forces...

For more information about John Morgan and Cotpech LLC's consulting and training services, see www.coptechllc.com. 

Drug legalization in Portugal

A thought-provoking item in the media recently:

Portugal decriminalized marijuana and most other drugs over a decade ago, with good results:
http://www.businessinsider.com.au/portugal-drug-policy-decriminalization-works-2012-7

Interestingly, the American drug courts model is not far off from the Portuguese experience. Many jurisdictions have moved to de facto decriminalize drug use without regard to whether the state is a medical marijuana state or has legalized or formally decriminalized pot. Drug courts have proven to be extremely effective ways to "enforce" treatment mechanisms with difficult populations. Those who wind up in prison are often repeat offenders who have "flunked" diversion programs or are guilty of dealing. To be fair, of course, there are still many prisoners who are simply drug addicts who should be dealt with by other means that would be more effective. Prison is a blunt instrument for a difficult problem. Other community and residential settings would get better results, protect public safety more effectively, and cost a whole lot less.

That said, I oppose legalization of marijuana or other drugs. Most importantly, we don't have an effective means to do road-side or workplace drug tests in real-time. (Some work has been done.) Those tests that do exist are qualitative yes-no tests and do not yield quantitative results of impairment. That is in contrast to the breathalyzer, which performs this service quite well every day. We have no idea of the number of drug-impaired drivers out on our roads or in workplaces. Although MADD and other citizen efforts have made a big impact on drunken driving over the last 30 years, I think their efforts would have been in vain if it weren't for the breathalyzer. When pot legalization advocates are on the front line demanding the development of better drug detection technology, I will take them more seriously. Instead, you have many idiots saying that pot makes them better drivers because they are "more mellow." Good research--and common sense--suggest the contrary. Without good detection technology, drug use cannot be labelled a personal choice. The rest of us will always be at risk from the idiots out there who could endanger us while they are drug-impaired. In most cities, more than half of arrestees are drunk or drug-intoxicated, so we know the problem is widespread.

I have another issue with current marijuana policy. It puts police in untenable situations. Federal and state laws now directly contradict one another in specific locations. Although the federal government under Obama appears to be backing off from enforcement in those locations, this raises serious questions about the uniformity of law and punishment. We can't condone pot use in some places and even encourage finance of marijuana sellers, then lock people up for the same activity in a neighboring state. There are differences in other areas in law and enforcement across the country, but I know of no other case in which you can serve 20 years in one state for doing something that would be legal in another. Police are the ones who must deal with this every day. They are expected to enforce the local law and deal with the contradictions, which breed cynicism in law enforcement and among criminals alike. The medical marijuana states are the worst offenders in this regard. I remember a visit to a fusion center in California that invested heavily to identify raid sites for marijuana enforcement in the same city where medical marijuana dealers could be seen out the window. These contradictions have become institutionalized in many "progressive" places in Europe, such as in Holland. I hope we do better by the police and our society going forward.

Practice and pitfalls of science advising

I wrote an article recently on science advising for the Forum on Physics and Society of the American Physical Society. Having been a senior executive and advisor in the criminal justice and the military, they asked for some perspective about how scientists can impact public policy. The opening paragraph is below, followed by a link to the APS web site for the rest of the article. For those of you who are non-scientists, it might give you some insight into how scientists view the world.

Government leaders require high-quality, objective scientific advice on a daily basis. Science advisors have played critical roles in the development of almost every major policy initiative in the last generation. In many cases, scientists have led agencies in the federal government and executed technically-complex programs. Nonetheless, scientists are often underrepresented or ineffective in policy discussions. Scientific principles or ideas are often misrepresented or oversimplified to meet political objectives. Science professionals should understand the importance of their input into the policy and practice of government at all levels. Further, we must understand that successful engagement requires an understanding of politics and communication skills. Finally, the science advisor must combine a healthy skepticism of the limits of science with a passionate advocacy for the advancement of science across all disciplines.

See here for the rest...

For more information on my current work helping police, military and security professionals with science and technology, see www.coptechllc.com.

Failures of counter-insurgency

On the night of May 2, 2011, six helicopters carrying 79 commandos raided a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan and killed Osama bin Laden, mastermind of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that killed nearly 3,000 people. It was the culmination of a ten-year manhunt that used the full resources of the United States of America. Never in history has the world been witness to any power even remotely comparable to the American military and intelligence machine, and never before had that apparatus been turned against one individual with such focus and ferocity. The stated objective of the raid—to kill or capture bin Laden—does not capture the full reality. In truth, the raid was about justice or revenge, take your pick, and the commandos were there as judge, jury, and executioner. In this, they were wildly successful. The target was killed at the expense of one crashed helicopter and no American casualties.
The mission was hailed in the United States and around much of the world as an exemplar of military daring, technology, and sheer will. Vice President Joe Biden—never one for understatement—called it the most audacious military plan in 500 years, though he advised President Obama against the raid. (By the way, he was wrong. The most audacious military plan in 500 years was the original incursion into Afghanistan after 9/11, in which a handful of special operations forces helped a ragtag army of insurgents to overthrow the Taliban government in a couple of months with almost no loss of life among the Americans.) Even many Muslims welcomed bin Laden’s demise, because his violent jihad had become a distraction from democratic progress in the Muslim world. Only in Pakistan was the reaction entirely negative, and that was due to the humiliation dealt to the country’s military because of the unilateral American action. The United States did not notify or coordinate the raid with Pakistan in any way—or at least any way that’s been public to date. And the Pakistanis appear to have been completely unable to react to the raid while it progressed at all. They seemed as completely oblivious as the Pakistani IT nerd, Sohaib Athar, who live-tweeted the raid that night.  In my view, though, his account was as accurate and insightful as any outside the Joint Special Operations Command headquarters, especially given his insights into his Pakistani countrymen. Osama bin Laden will not be mourned by many in the Islamic world, even those who resent or hate the United States for its actions in the War on Terror.
But, it is fair to ask, was the mission a success on a broader, strategic level? By this, I mean the real mission, that of fighting terror, ensuring stability and extending freedom in the world. Did America win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Has the War on Terror fundamentally changed the dynamic that led to the 9/11 attacks? In this sense, the blood and treasure expended has been a failure. Terror has been suppressed, to be sure, but Islamist extremism is alive and well. Iraq and Afghanistan are not shining beacons of democracy and individual freedom, though one may certainly argue they are better off than they were in 2001. North Africa has become a seething cauldron from Sudan and Libya to Nigeria and Mali. Iran, the Philippines, Syria, Yemen and North Korea all represent serious strategic challenges with no end in sight. One would hope that unbridled American power could produce more salutary results.
The next question is obvious: why not? Some would argue that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq—particularly the latter—were ill-conceived and doomed to failure. Pacifists and isolationists oppose the overuse of the American war machine. My question, though, is different. I am not asking about the wisdom of the wars, which is an interesting question but not my point. Instead, I am asking why American power did not succeed regardless of the wisdom of the adventure. After all, Genghis Khan had the closest thing to the kind of dominant military machine of modern America and terrorized all of Europe and Asia. But what did the Mongols gain by sacking Kiev and Baghdad? Their thirteenth century wars did not make Mongolia rich or a great power for very long and I doubt if the Mongolians as a people were better off as a result of them, so it is fair to question the wisdom of their rampages. But they won the wars nonetheless, leaving those cities and dozens more in smoldering ruins. Wise or not, they won their wars without question. The United States is capable of winning wars. After World War II, military force gave way to nation-building and the Axis powers became allies of the United States. After the Cold War, Eastern Europe and the Baltic republics became free and the Soviet Union changed into Russia, an autocratic state but an essentially lesser rival. But it is unclear whether the war aims in Iraq and Afghanistan, whatever they actually were, have been achieved. Like Vietnam, messy conflicts have given way to ambiguous results.

More on this in later posts...

For more information on John Morgan's company, Coptech LLC, a provider of consulting and training services for police, military, and other security sectors, see www.coptechllc.com.

Credibility Assessment - an overview

A wide variety of practitioners use credibility assessment to inform critical decisions. The criminal justice community need to determine the veracity of suspects and witnesses. Special operations forces need to assess insider threats, indigenous personnel and detainees. Intelligence agencies need to screen individuals who may have access to sensitive information to determine whether they pose an insider threat or other risk. To date, professionals in these communities rely on a variety of methods - interview techniques, mental health assessment, and the polygraph. Over the past 20 years a large body of scientific data has shown that many of these methods lack scientific validation or operational rigor in specific applications, particularly when the subject is mentally unstable or has an ideological basis for dissimulation. In addition, most are based on a model of lying that assumes a deceptive person will exhibit signals of fear, alarm or anxiety when telling a lie.   As a result, screening has failed to detect many—perhaps most—individuals who have deliberately compromised national security. Most recently, screening failed to detect deception and mental instability in the cases of Edward Snowden and Aaron Alexis, the Navy Yard shooter. In addition, insider threats have not been detected in a reliable manner during the conflict in Afghanistan.
Polygraph techniques have been applied for over 60 years in essentially unchanged form, despite the poor reliability in detecting deception. For example, the National Academy of Sciences called the validation of the polygraph “scanty and scientifically weak.” Specifically, their report states, ”Polygraph research has not developed and tested theories of the underlying factors that produce observed responses.” In other words, there is poor understanding of the connection between a physiological response and underlying psychological states. Further, most attempts to validate the polygraph have involved mock crime scenarios in laboratory settings involving individuals who would be unlikely to otherwise commit crimes or intelligence breaches. Cross-cultural studies and field studies of real-world subjects are almost non-existent.
In this context, validity has a scientific meaning. “Validity is an overall evaluative judgment of the degree to which empirical evidence and theoretical rationales support the adequacy and appropriateness of interpretations and actions on the basis of test scores or other modes of assessment.” The National Academy of Sciences report on polygraph outlined several aspects of validity as it relates to credibility assessment tools, including test-retest reliability, inter-rater reliability, internal consistency, criterion validity (i.e., accuracy), and construct validity. Construct validity is the extent to which explanatory theories account for the performance of a test and may include issues related to the environmental context. Most validation studies of credibility assessment have used artificial elements to simulate actual jeopardy or lack a concept of operations or structure for application. Thus, construct validity has been a major weakness in the field.
 
Novel Credibility Assessment Methods

Although there have been minimal federal investments in the development of credibility assessment, nonetheless many novel approaches have been developed that hold promise to improve future practice. Some of these methods are based on a theory of operation similar to polygraph. They assume guilty knowledge on the part of the subject that will alter the physiological responses of the subject upon examination. These methods include non-contact polygraph, infrared imaging, voice stress, and fidget response, among many others. One can speculate that improved polygraph-like examination may be possible by the adoption of these techniques to minimize the intrusiveness of polygraph examination, extend the environments in which “guilty knowledge” methods may be applied, and—presumably—improve accuracy through the adoption of metrics that are orthogonal to polygraph measurement protocols. Unfortunately, none of these methods have proven to be effective in independent studies. For example, a study among arrestee populations showed that voice stress analysis was no better than chance at detecting deception about recent drug abuse when compared with urinalysis results.
More promising approaches rely on different underlying theories. A deceptive individual—regardless of their motivation—requires greater cognitive load to maintain a deception than to tell the truth. Thus, interview techniques or tasks that enhance the underlying cognitive load – whether by requiring the individual to make a drawing of a scene, recount events in reverse or sort between competing stimuli—make it more difficult for a person to maintain a story or deception. Further, research over the past decade indicates it is possible to detect cognitive load through analysis of language, measures of physiology and of brain activity. For many years, police agencies have relied on cognitive interviewing, a lengthy process which is based on cueing individuals with details from an event and other strategies to enhance accurate memory recall. In general, modified cognitive interviewing (MCI) shortens the process to a limited number of memory prompts (including visual, auditory, personal feelings and temporal reversal), uses a more informal interview approach, and emphasizes analysis of speech content and other indicators of cognitive load. MCI has been demonstrated to be more effective than the judgment of experience human investigators and potentially superior to polygraph examination. Forced-choice testing can complement MCI or other approaches through accurate and innovative screening of large numbers of individuals. In forced-choice testing, the subject is given a limited number of options, such as a lineup of pictures that includes a possible target known to the subject. Those with hidden knowledge are much more likely to exclude the target than others, thus permitting screening and providing investigative insight. These and related techniques may be amenable to wide adoption in many circumstances, including as part of a program of ongoing vetting of cleared individuals as anticipated by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Some attention has also been given to micro expressions, which are very brief facial expressions, lasting just fractions of a second, that are presumed to reflect emotional reactions. Presumably, the micro expression will manifest even if the subject is concealing the emotion, whether that intent is deliberate or unconscious. Therefore, micro expressions may be a useful means to detect deception using automated tools, trained examiners, or even after-the-fact video analysis.
Finally, neuroscience may provide some options for specific applications or elucidation of mechanisms involved in other approaches. Functional MRI examines cognitive load by directly measuring brain activity in the prefrontal and parietal lobes. This builds on the psychological understanding of cognitive load during deception described above. The technique is now marketed commercially. (Note: Only No Lie MRI is currently promoting fMRI for this purpose. Cephos no longer offers this service.) Other approaches rely on specific brainwave patterns, such as the P300 recognition response, an approach with a long history and sometimes referred to as brain fingerprinting. This brainwave pattern arises when an individual recognizes an image or idea in sensory stimuli. Brain fingerprinting is based on the theory of concealed information. For example, if an individual is shown a picture of a crime scene, then the P300 response may be detected if the person has prior, presumably concealed knowledge of the crime.  One of the advantages of employing techniques that reveal activity in the human brain is that they potentially enhance the ability to determine which types of activities in the brain are associated with various types of deception. A significant disadvantage to fMRI and other types of brain measures is that the counter-measures are not difficult (for example breathholding, moving, thinking of something else) and the paradigm for which they seem most relevant is the guilty knowledge paradigm. Also, direct brain imaging raises concerns among civil libertarians about the potential for abuse of privacy among non-cooperative subjects. That said, they may show promise for the vetting of employees and other willing participants. In addition, these analytical methods may elucidate the cognitive processes involved in deception that may be revealed by other, less intrusive means.
For more information about credibility assessment or access to Coptech LLC's training and consulting services, please see coptechllc.com.

Technology challenges in community policing

Over the past twenty years, policing has undergone profound change as a result of developments in community policing, technological advances, and the increasing use of technology in everyday life. These trends are closely aligned. For example, modern radios enable an officer to maintain contact with dispatch regardless of location; information systems and analysis provides critical understanding of people and situations while allowing for performance measurement on a continuous basis; even officer safety equipment—such as body armor—not only protects but allows the officer to actively engage and interact with the community without compromising safety. The Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS) has recognized this nexus through the provision of technology grants totaling approximately $827 million to more than 1,400 agencies to date. Furthermore, the COPS office has developed numerous publications and training programs to assist police chiefs and others in the selection and deployment of technology.These products have been oriented toward the development of effective internal processes to ensure good requirements development and sound procurement practices. In sector-specific areas, such as information technology, the products capture more detailed, technical information. I have developed a Police Technologist Training and Certification Program to build on these successes by providing a mechanism for mid-level police professionals—both uniform and civilian—to obtain training on the basics of technology deployment, sector-specific technical information, and a solid grounding in the principles of science and technology as they relate to policing.

A commonly recognized problem within the law enforcement community is that of the “accidental project manager.” The accidental project manager is often an individual assigned by a police chief to manage technology deployment because of past exemplary work, that may not be technology specific, and to some extent, this is not surprising. Police require new technology to protect the public and perform their duties effectively and efficiently; however, police departments cannot afford to hire full-time scientists, engineers and technologists to develop and manage technology deployments. As a result, a wide range of police officers and civilians are given the responsibility for executing technology programs on behalf of their departments while lacking the training necessary to make the best, most-well-informed plans and decisions.

Most current training available to police focuses on the internal processes needed to manage procurements successfully or on community engagement. Other work delves into sector-specific technical information. In particular, there has been excellent work in the development of training in information technology. For example, SEARCH provides extensive training related to information systems management and electronic crime. While these are worthwhile objectives, project managers lack the ability to work across all of the domains of interest, which include communications, information systems, sensors and surveillance, forensics, tactical systems, protective systems, homeland security, electronic crime, and many more. To obtain this foundation, the police professional requires an understanding of the principles of systems engineering, the basics of science and technology, and an introduction to the fundamental considerations across the broad range of technologies relevant to policing. For example, such an individual may need to know the differences between types of body armor one day, but be required to choose a facial recognition system on another day. To date, no training or certification exists to establish such a foundation; therefore, police chiefs continue to rely on their best available person, whether or not that individual has any relevant training or education. The majority of the time, a technology vendor is more knowledgeable than the staff they are supplying. Even if the system procured works as advertised, it often won’t meet the operational objectives anticipated by the department during the planning stages. Furthermore, ongoing maintenance and training costs to use the equipment may make it very difficult for a department to keep any particular technology operational past its initial deployment phase.

These problems detract from effective policing in a number of ways. Firstly, inexperienced project managers fail to engage the community on the deployment of sensitive technology. For example, Taser deployments may be compromised because the police departments are unaware of the full scope of health and safety considerations associated with taser use and therefore, can’t articulate the appropriate research basis to demonstrate whether deployment policies will improve outcomes in use-of-force incidents. The inability to properly articulate alienates the community before police have even stepped foot outside the station house. Secondly, ineffective technology deployment wastes resources and prevents effective policing. For example, a poorly-conceived communications system wastes officer time with constant system updates, poor voice or data quality, and insufficient operability and interoperability. Finally, effective technology management enables problem-solving that would not be otherwise possible. A well thought out surveillance system has a higher chance of being accepted by the community if, for example, the police are able to articulate that it can reduce crime in hot spot areas by utilizing strong mobile data systems to link information gained from an engaged community to crime trends thereby promoting  proactive policing.
For more information about the police technologist training program, visit www.coptechllc.com.